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Abstract
The legal notion of damages requires to compare the actual value
of the creditor’s assets with the hypothetical value that would have
prevailed if the debtor had met his obligation. Moreover, values and
causation may be uncertain. If nature’s contribution is modelled as a
random move then the interaction between debtor and nature can be
described in normal form which, in turn, allows to capture causality
and legal damages in a consistent way. In practice, such random
moves of nature are rarely observable. Yet, statistical inference may
reveal sufficient information to test for causation and to estimate legal
damages on average over observable events as the present paper will
establish.
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1 Introduction
Think of medical practitioner A who was negligent in treating several of his
patients. As a consequence, 7 out of 10 were suffering from bodily harm,
each equivalent to L = 100 in money terms. Under careful treatment, 4 out
of 10 would nonetheless suffer the same losses but 6 out of 10 would have
been cured. It is assumed that these statistical data are known from relevant
test series of similar cases. What quantum of damages (if any) should be
awarded to patients of the negligent practitioner A?
Or think of professional coach A who did not cover the latest revision
of competition law, which, however, turned out to be relevant for the exam.
Among his students, 6 out of 10 failed the exam. Students of another coach
who met his obligation performed better. In fact, only 3 out of 10 failed
the exam while 7 out of 10 did pass. Students who pass the exam earn, on
average, LP = 20 below some maximum income level whereas students who
failed earn, on average, LF = 70 below the same maximum. What damages
does the negligent coach A owe to his student B, who failed the exam?
The common features of these first two cases are as follows. Party A takes
a decision that affects the probability of an accident and is ruled, beyond
dispute, to violate A’s obligation. Yet, the accident would also have occurred
with positive, though lower probability if A had met his obligation. Therefore
it remains uncertain whether it was A’s negligence that has actually caused
the harm or just bad luck.
In a third case, there are two candidates a = 1, 2 that may have caused
harm of fixed size L = 100 to victim B. If both candidates had met their
obligations the accident would still have occurred with probability εoo =
2/10 whereas if both have neglected their obligations then the probability
of an accident would be εnn = 7/10. If just one of the two candidates had
neglected his obligation then the probabilities of an accident are εon = 3/10
and εno = 5/10, respectively. What damages (if any) would each of the two
candidates owe to B if it is known beyond dispute that both have neglected
their obligations?
To determine legal damages, by definition, the actual situation under A’s
negligent decision must be compared with the purely hypothetical situation
that would have resulted if A had met his obligation. Since the accident
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is claimed to occur with positive probability but lower than one, nature is
implicitly interpreted as rolling dices. For doctrinal reasons, it proves use-
ful to express the interaction between party A and nature in normal form.1
According to this view, nature’s contribution is modelled as a random move,
drawn independently of A’s decision. The accident technology then deter-
mines whether an accident actually occurs or not as a function of A’s decision
and the random move of nature.
Suppose the accident has occurred and A’s decision was negligent. If
the random move of nature were observable then the hypothetical question
could easily be addressed. In fact, just plug the non-negligent decision and
the same actual move of nature into the accident technology. If the accident
still occurs A’s negligence did not cause it. If, however, the accident would
have been avoided, then A’s negligence has actually caused it and A would
owe legal damages equivalent to the full harm suffered by party B.
Of course, such moves of nature are rarely observable. Observable may
just be the event that an accident has occurred. The present paper prop-
agates to still award true legal damages but on average over the observed
event only. Such an approach nicely fits legal doctrine, the only drawback
being that the interaction between nature and party A should be known in
normal form.
As it turns out, the statistical data presented for the above three examples
are not sufficient to determine legal damages on average over the observed
event. For the first example, however, just one more piece of information is
needed: The probability, with which an accident would occur if A has met his
obligation but would have been avoided if A had neglected it. Under these
circumstances, party B would enjoy a windfall gain caused by A’s negligence
that, based on common legal practice, party B could keep for free.
It will be shown, at the one extreme where the probability of windfall
gains is equal to the probability of an accident under non-negligent behavior,
legal damages on average over the observed event are equivalent to the full
loss suffered by B, well in line with the traditional negligence rule pioneered
by Brown (1973). At the other extreme where windfall gains can be ruled
out entirely, legal damages on average over the observed event turn out to be
1The insight that interaction in general can be expressed in normal form is ascribed to
John von Neumann as Myerson (1999) has pointed out.
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equivalent to Shavell’s (1985) proportionality rule. Particularly interesting
seems to be the intermediate case where the probabilities of accidents are pure
in the sense that all patients are of the same type: If a patient recovers in
spite of negligent treatment then he is still believed to suffer with probability
4 out of 10 in the hypothetical situation where the practitioner had met
his obligation. For the given statistical data, under pure uncertainty, legal
damages on average over the observable event are equal to 60 percent of the
victim’s actual loss as will be shown later in this paper.2
The second example turns out to be even more puzzling. Suppose the
student did pass the exam in spite of the coach’s negligent behavior. Then
legal damages on average over the observed event that the student has passed
the exam may still happen to be positive. On intuitive grounds, one is
tempted to argue that no accident has occurred and, hence, no damages are
due. The puzzle resolves if the following consideration is taken into account.
The coach was negligent but the student did pass the exam. Thereafter,
this student was less successful at the labor market where he ended up with a
low paying job. Compare this with the hypothetical situation where the coach
had met his obligation but where, this time, the student failed the exam. At
the labor market, however, this student may be more lucky, ending up in
fact with a higher paying job. If such a hypothetical situation is believed to
occur with positive probability then, indeed, the negligent coach may owe a
positive quantum of damages even to students who passed the exam. If such
damages were denied, incentives could well be distorted.
So far, losses were assumed to be of fixed size. Yet, the actual as well
as the hypothetical value of assets affected by an accident may vary to a
larger degree. If they do the following conceptual issue arises. Suppose party
A has neglected his obligation and the actual value of the affected assets is
observable. The actual value must be compared with the hypothetical one
if A had met his obligation. The hypothetical value may now be higher or
lower than the actual value. If it is lower then windfall gains from negligent
behavior are involved and the question arises: While taking averages over
observable events, should B keep such hypothetical windfall gains for free or
should they be offset against B’s losses over the observed event?
2Gerhard Wagner and other legal scholars have pointed out to me that this rule is used
in France, where it is referred to as ”perte d’une chance”.
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Kahan (1989) argues that party A owes damages equal to the difference
between the value of the affected assets if A had met versus A’s actually
having neglected his obligation. It will be shown that Kahan’s rule coincides
with average legal damages if windfall gains are offset against losses over the
observed event.
From a practical perspective, calculating legal damages on average over
observable events turns out to be simpler if windfall gains are offset against
losses. From a doctrinal perspective, it may be objectionable to treat windfall
gains differently just because they happen not to be observable. From the
economic perspective, it does not really matter. In fact, as long as the victim
is (at least) fully compensated and meeting the obligation is socially preferred
to neglecting it — the Hand Formula — then party A has the incentive to meet
his obligation under both schemes. While leaving windfall gains for free may
lead to overcompensation of B, party A can easily escape liability by meeting
his obligation.
The paper also addresses the case of uncertain causation in the presence
of multiple injurers. To express the interaction between all these injurers
and nature in normal form, the accident technology must be specified as a
function of the profile of individual decisions and the random move of nature.
For simplicity, cost complementarities between injurers are ruled out. The
accident technology under consideration, however, allows for externalities
between individual decisions of the fully general type.
Suppose each of the injurer has the obligation to decide in a way such that
the sum of total costs and expected losses attains a minimum if all injurers
are meeting their obligations (extended Hand Formula). Suppose further
that the victim is fully compensated (in ex ante terms at least) for expected
losses from deviations. Then, as will be shown, details of sharing damages
owed to B among negligent injurers are of no importance with respect to
incentives because each injurer can unilaterally escape liability by meeting
his obligation. In fact, not even collusion, let alone non-cooperative behavior,
will allow the group of potential injurers to gain from neglecting some or all
of their obligations if such damages are implemented.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with cases of fixed harm
size. The notion of legal damages on average over observable events is defined
explicitly and it is shown that such damages provide efficient incentives.
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The interaction in normal form is constructed from the statistical data and
from hypotheses on potential chains of causation. The first example of the
introduction will be revisited in this section as well.
While harm size is still kept fixed, section 3 adds observable signals, which
the quantum of damages must be based on. Shavell (1985) has examined a
model of this type. It is shown that Shavell’s proportionality rule allows for
an interpretation as legal damages on average over observable events. The
second example of the introduction is also studied in detail, the observable
signal being whether the student has passed or failed the exam.
In section 4, accidents are assumed to cause losses of variable size. The
issue of windfall gains being offset or not against losses on average over
observable events is discussed. The efficiency of incentives is shown to prevail
for both versions of the damage rule. Section 5 establishes the efficiency
result if several injurers may have caused the accident and revisits the third
example of the introduction. Section 6 concludes.
2 Binary asset values
Party A is facing a decision r ∈ R at costs c(r) that affects the value of party
B’s assets in an uncertain way. For the present section, it is assumed that
assets are attaining just two values from the range ρB = {b0 = −L, b1 = 0}.
I have the following interpretation in mind. If there is an accident then B
suffers from harm of fixed size L whereas, if there is none, the value of B’s
assets is not affected at all. Moreover, let us assume that it is known from
test series of similar cases that the relative frequency of an accident amounts
to 0 ≤ ε(r) ≤ 1 provided that A has taken decision r ∈ R.
If this test series contains sufficiently many independent draws, ε(r) can
also be referred to as the probability of an accident. Whether nature is
actually rolling dices or not may remain a matter of philosophical dispute.
Yet, probabilities have proven to be a most useful device of modelling and
describing uncertain events.
The economic analysis of tort law refers to the setting at hand as the
accident model. The model serves to investigate incentives for precaution
arising from negligence rules. Suppose it were A’s obligation to decide ro ∈ R
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but, instead, A has actually decided rn 6= ro.3 By such negligent behavior,
A has saved c(ro) − c(rn) in terms of private costs but, at the same time,
has raised the probability of an accident by ε(rn) − ε(ro) > 0. The Hand
Formula
0 < c(ro)− c(rn) < [ε(rn)− ε(ro)] · L
is assumed to be fulfilled and, hence, it is socially desirable that A meets his
obligation.
If an accident occurs, A may be held liable. The legal question behind
injurer A’s liability concerns the hypothetical situation that would have re-
sulted if, ceteris paribus, A had met his obligation. According to common
legal doctrine, party A is held liable only if, by meeting the obligation, the
accident would have been avoided. Put differently, party A’s negligence must
have caused the accident for A to owe any damages.
The probability of an accident may remain positive even if A meets his
obligation, i.e., ε(ro) > 0, in which case causation is uncertain. To settle the
issue of liability from a theoretical perspective, it proves useful to visualize
nature’s contribution in what game theorists call the normal form of interac-
tion. In normal form, nature is simultaneously ”choosing” from a set ω ∈ Ω
of alternative moves of nature — the outcome space — as party A is choosing
from his set r ∈ R of strategies. While A is assumed to behave strategically,
nature is assumed to be governed by an exogenous probability measure π: For
any subset (event) Ω0 of the outcome space Ω, π(Ω0) denotes the probability,
with which the event Ω0 occurs. The accident model in normal form com-
bines this probability measure with a function e : R×Ω→ {0, 1}, referred to
as the accident technology. By construction, this function attains the value
e(r,ω) = 1 if and only if an accident is resulting from the interaction.
To begin with, suppose the actual move of nature ω were observable.
Then legal doctrine would rule A liable for the full loss L if the accident has
actually occurred under A’s negligent behavior but would have been avoided
if A had met his obligation. For short, the quantum of damages then amounts
to
D(rn,ω) = max [e(rn,ω)− e(ro,ω), 0] · L.
3Instead of a tort relationship, the obligation may also arise from a contractual
relationship.
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The same rule may alternatively be expressed in terms of events. Let Ωij =
{ω ∈ Ω : e(rn,ω) = i ∧ e(ro,ω) = j} denote events leading to the partition
Ω = Ω00∪Ω01∪Ω10∪Ω11 of the outcome space. Given the negligent decision
rn, an accident occurs in the event Ω1 = Ω10∪Ω11 whereas no accident occurs
in the event Ω0 = Ω00 ∪Ω01.While A owes damages of L in the event Ω10 he
would escape liability in the event Ω11. In the event Ω01, B enjoys windfall
gains due to A’s negligence. To be consistent with the statistical data of the
model, π(Ω1) = ε(rn) and
0 ≤ π(Ω01) ≤ π(Ω01 ∪ Ω11) = ε(ro)
must hold.
Unfortunately, different versions of the accident model in normal form
may be consistent with the same statistical data but, nevertheless, may lead
to different judgment as will be shown later in this section.
The move of nature itself need not be observable but the fact that an
accident has occurred may still be. In this case, it is the event Ω1 that can
be observed. What level of damages should be awarded in such an event?
The obvious solution consists of still awarding true legal damages but on
average over the observed event only. More precisely, if the event Ω0 ⊂ Ω is
observed, average legal damages amount to
d(rn,Ω0) = E[D(rn,ω) | Ω0],
i.e. the expected value of true legal damages conditional on the observed
event. Accordingly, in the event Ω1, average legal damages amount to
d(rn,Ω1) = E[D(r
n,ω) | Ω1] = π(Ω10)π(Ω1) · L
while, in the event Ω corresponding to no information, average legal damages
amount to
d(rn,Ω) = π(Ω10) · L = π(Ω1) · d(rn,Ω1).
Of course, no damages are due if A has met his obligation, i.e. d(ro,Ω0) = 0
for any observable event Ω0. The following proposition can be established.
Proposition 1 Legal damages on average over the event that an accident
has occurred amount to
d(rn,Ω1) =




and can be calculated from the statistical data if, in addition, the probability
π(Ω01) of windfall gains is known. Moreover, in expected terms, party B is
at least as well off as if A had met his obligation4 and, hence, would owe no
damages to B , i.e.
π(Ω1) · [d(rn,Ω1)− L] ≥ −π(Ω01 ∪ Ω11) · L
whereas party A has the incentive to meet his obligation as
c(rn) + π(Ω1) · d(rn,Ω1) > c(ro)
holds.
Proof. If ω ∈ Ω0 then no accident occurs even though A has neglected
his obligation and, hence, no damages are due. Consider the partition Ω =
Ω1 ∪ Ω00 ∪ Ω01 of the outcome space. It then follows from Bayes’ rule and
from consistency with the statistical data that
[ε(rn)− ε(ro)] · L = E [e(rn,ω)− e(ro,ω)] · L =
= π(Ω1) ·E [e(rn,ω)− e(ro,ω) | Ω1] · L− π(Ω01) · L =
= π(Ω1) · d(r,Ω1)− π(Ω01) · L
from which the first claim follows immediately.
It then follows from the first claim that
π(Ω1)·[d(rn,Ω1)− L] = π(Ω10)·L−π(Ω1)·L = −π(Ω11)·L ≥ −π(Ω11∪Ω01)·L
such that the second claim is established, which jointly with the Hand Rule
implies
c(rn) + π(Ω1) · d(rn,Ω1) >
c(ro)− [ε(rn)− ε(ro)] · L+ π(Ω1) · d(rn,Ω1) ≥
c(ro)− ε(rn)− ε(ro) · L+ π(Ω1) · L− π(Ω01 ∪ Ω11) · L = c(ro)
and the third claim is established as well.
In order to calculate legal damages on average over the event Ω1 that
an accident has occurred, the probability π(Ω01) of windfall gains must be
4This corresponds to the saddle point property that Schweizer (2005a) has identified
as the driving force behind efficient incentives.
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known. Consider, first, the case of pure uncertainty where nature is rolling
dices with independent probabilities ε(rn) and ε(ro) as indicated by tree (a) of
Figure 1. Under pure uncertainty, the probability of windfall gains amounts
to π(Ω01) = [1− ε(rn)] · ε(ro) such that legal damages on average over the
event amount to
d(rn,Ω1) = [1− ε(ro)] · L
as follows from the first claim of Proposition 1. Notice, 1 − ε(ro) is the
probability with which the accident would have been avoided if A had met
his obligation. It is this loss of chance (in French, ”perte d’une chance”) that
determines the percentage of the harm, which B can recover.
The first example of the introduction may serve as an illustration. Under
careful treatment, 6 patients out of 10 are cured while 4 out of 10 would
still suffer from harm equivalent to L = 100. If these relative frequencies are
interpreted as probabilities in the usual way then εo = 4/10 and 1−εo = 6/10
such that, under pure uncertainty, legal damages on average over the observed
event amount to d(rn,Ω1) = 60 as claimed in the introduction.
Consider, second, tree (b) of Figure 1. Here, uncertainty is type-contingent
in the following sense. Nature is rolling a dice which determines whether the
case is of type t = N (with probability ε(ro)) or of type t = A (with prob-
ability 1 − ε(ro)). Types react in different ways to negligent treatment. In
fact, if the case is of type t = N , then the accident occurs whether A is
meeting his obligation or not. If, however, the case is of type t = A then the
accident is avoided if A has met his obligation whereas the accident occurs





must be imposed. Notice, under this interpretation, windfall gains will never





as follows from the first claim of Proposition 1. Such damages are in line
with Shavell’s (1985) proportionality rule.5
[Figure 1 here, approximately]
5For the general case studied by Shavell, the reader is referred to section 3 below.
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For the statistical data of the example, legal damages on average over the




· 100 ≈ 42, 86
if windfall gains can be ruled out entirely.
At the other extreme, finally, where all accidents that occur if A has met
his obligation are of the windfall type, i.e. π(Ω01) = ε(ro), legal damages on
average over the observed event amount to d(rn,Ω1) = L, well in line with
the traditional negligence rule as pioneered by Brown (1973).
The present analysis uncovers legal damages on average over the observed
event as the unifying doctrine behind all these rules. It is the probability
of windfall gains caused by A’s neglecting his obligation that makes the
difference.
The general extensive form of the accident model consists of three stages.
At stage 0, nature is choosing the type t ∈ T of the case from a (finite) set
of alternatives. Type t is chosen with probability µt where
P
t∈T µt = 1. At
stage 1, party A decides between neglecting (rn) and meeting his obligation
(ro). At stage 2, suppose the case is of type t. Then the accident causing
harm to B of fixed size L occurs with probability εnt if A has neglected his
obligation and with probability εot if A has met it. The situation is referred
to as one of pure uncertainty provided that a single type exists whereas, if
there are several types, uncertainty is called type-contingent.
The general extensive form of the accident model is consistent with the
statistical data if X
t∈T
µt · εnt = ε(rn) and
X
t∈T
µt · εot = ε(ro)




µt · (1− εnt ) · εot
and vanishes only under the following condition. For all types t, either the
accident is avoided for sure if A has met his obligation, i.e. εot = 0 or, if it
still occurs with positive probability, then the accident must occur for sure
if A neglects his obligation, i.e. εnt = 1. As soon as at least one type violates
this condition, i.e. εot > 0 and εnt < 1 for some type t then windfall gains
occur with positive probability.
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3 Observable signals
In the previous section, it was assumed to be observable whether an accident
has occurred or not. The analysis is now extended to include more general
events. To this end, signals are introduced as functions Q : R×Ω→ ρQ that
map any combination of party A’s decision and random move of nature into
a range ρQ of observable signals. Suppose, by deciding rn 6= ro, party A has
neglected his obligation. If signal q ∈ ρQ shows up then it is the event
Ωq = {ω ∈ Ω : Q(rn,ω) = q}





whereas if, in addition, it is observed that an accident has actually occurred
then legal damages on average over this event amount to




Notice the events Ωij are defined as in the previous section. In particular, it
holds that Ω10 ⊂ Ω1 = Ω10 ∪ Ω11 and, hence, d(rn,Ωq) ≤ d(rn,Ωq ∩ Ω1).
If legal damages are granted on average over such events, it follows from
the Hand Formula and Proposition 1 in combination with Bayes’ rule that
X
q∈ρQ





π(Ωq) · d(rn,Ωq) > c(ro)
must both hold. The term on the right of the first inequality is party B’s
expected loss which B must bear if A has met his obligation and, for that
reason, escapes liability. The term on the left is B’s net position if A has
neglected his obligation and owes legal damages on average over the observed
events to B. The first inequality then establishes that party B is at least as
well off as if A had met his obligation. The second inequality shows that, as
a consequence of the Hand Formula, party A still has the incentive to meet
his obligation.
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The setting including observable signals allows to capture the model ex-
amined by Shavell (1985) as well as the case of the negligent coach from the
introduction of the present paper. To capture Shavell’s model, consider the
range ρQ = {0, A,N,L} of potential signals with the following interpreta-
tion in mind. If signal q = 0 shows up no accident has occurred whereas
an accident has occurred if any of the other three signals is observed. If
q = A then, by assumption, the accident is known to be caused by party A
while it is caused by nature (the natural agent in Shavell’s words) if signal
q = N occurs. If, however, signal q = L is observed the accident remains of
ambiguous origin.
Implicitly at least, Shavell rules out windfall gains, i.e. π(Ω01) = 0. More-
over, in my notation, the accident is said to be caused by A and by nature
in the events Ω10 and Ω11, respectively. Shavell denotes the probabilities of
these events by π(Ω10) = p and π(Ω11) = n. As a final piece of notation,
Shavell introduces the probabilities
α = prob {ΩL ∩ Ω10 | Ω10} and β = prob {ΩL ∩ Ω11 | Ω11}
which denote the conditional probabilities of an accident caused by party A
and nature, respectively, appearing to be of ambiguous origin.6
Given these statistical data, it follows that the probabilities of an accident
caused by party A and nature appears to be of ambiguous origin amount to
π{ΩL ∩ Ω10} = α · p and π{ΩL ∩ Ω11} = β · n, respectively and, hence, legal




π{ΩL} · L =
α · p
α · p+ β · n · L,
which is equivalent to Shavell’s proportionality rule. If, however, party A is
observed as the origin of the accident then legal damages on average over
this event of size L are granted, i.e. d(rn,ΩA) = L whereas A does not owe
any damages if the accident is known to be caused by the natural agent, i.e.
d(rn,ΩN) = 0. In this sense, Shavell’s rule can be interpreted quite generally
as legal damages on average over observable events.
6Notice the game tree (b) in Figure 1 corresponds th Shavell’s model for the parameters
α = β = 1.
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To examine the case of the negligent coach in the present framework,
the range ρQ = {P, F} of observable signals must be considered with the
interpretation that signals q = P and q = F occur if student B has passed
and failed the exam, respectively. If it is just observed whether party B has








respectively. If, in addition, it is observed that party B has actually suffered
a loss, legal damages amount to
d(rn,ΩP ∩ Ω1) =
π(ΩP ∩ Ω10)
π(ΩP ∩ Ω1)




respectively. Notice, legal damages on average over the event that party B
has passed the exam are positive if, and only if the probability π(ΩP ∩ Ω10)
that the student passes the exam, still suffers from the loss of income but
would suffer from no such loss if the coach had met his obligation is positive.
If damages were denied whenever the student has passed the exam in spite of
the coach’s negligent teaching, incentives may be distorted as the following
example of pure uncertainty illustrates.
Let LP = ηP · L < LF = ηF · L denote the average loss of income of
students who have passed and failed the exam, respectively, as compared
to the maximum income level. Under pure uncertainty, these averages are
assumed to depend just on the observed signal though not on the quality of
coach A’s teaching. The probabilities γo > γn that a student fails the exam,
however, depend on whether the coach has met his obligation or not, i.e.
whether he has decided ro or rn. Notice, under pure uncertainty, all students
are assumed to be of the same capabilities such that passing or failing the
exam is entirely due to the teaching quality and nature’s trembles.
The probabilities of passing and failing the exam and, at the same time,
suffering from a loss amount to
π(ΩP ∩ Ω1) = (1− γn) · ηP and π(ΩF ∩ Ω1) = γn · ηF
if the coach has neglected his obligation. The probabilities that these losses
occur and are caused by A’s negligence amount to
π(ΩP ∩ Ω10) = (1− γn) · ηP ·
h




π(ΩF ∩ Ω10) = γn · ηF ·
h
1− γo · ηF − (1− γo) · ηP
i
.
It follows that, under pure uncertainty, legal damages on average over the
event that an accident has occurred and the student fails or passes the exam
are identical, i.e.
d(rn,ΩP ∩ Ω1) = d(rn,ΩF ∩ Ω1) =
h
1− γo · ηF − (1− γo) · ηP
i
· L
and, hence, are both positive if students enjoying careful coaching can expect
to avoid losses with positive probability.
For illustration, take the statistical data presented in the introduction
(γn = 6/10, γo = 3/10, L = 100, LP = 20 and LF = 70). Then legal
damages on average over the observed event amount to





· 20 = 65
and are positive indeed.
If damages were denied whenever the student has passed the exam in
spite of negligent coaching, the student would remain at least as well off as
if the coach had met his obligation and, hence, would have avoided liability
for sure if the inequality
π(ΩF ∩ Ω10)− π(Ω10 ∪ Ω11) ≥ −π(Ω01 ∪ Ω11)
or, equivalently, the inequality
π(Ω01) ≥ π(ΩP ∩ Ω10)
were met. In other words, to still ensure compensation of the student who
is denied recovery whenever he passes the exam, the probability of windfall
gains caused by negligent coaching would have to be sufficiently high. Oth-
erwise incentives of the coach may be distorted downwards even if the Hand
Formula is met.
4 General distributions of asset values
More often than not, the actual value of assets affected by an accident and,
a fortiori, their value in the hypothetical situation where the injurer had met
15
his obligation is uncertain. To deal with such cases, the accident model is
extended to allow for losses of variable size.
The potential injurer is still facing a decision r ∈ R at costs c(r) that
affects the value of party B’s assets. The uncertain value is from the (finite)
range ρB. The distribution of values depends on A’s decision. Let f(b, r)
denote the probability that B’s assets attain the value b ∈ ρB provided that
A has decided r ∈ R. These distributions play the role of the statistical data
of a case for the present extension of the accident model. Probabilities sum
up to one, i.e.
P
b∈ρ f(b, r) = 1 and the expected value of B’s assets as a




f(b, r) · b.
Suppose it is A’s obligation to meet the standard ro ∈ R but A is actually
neglecting his obligation and decides rn 6= ro instead. The Hand Formula
β(rn)− c(rn) < β(ro)− c(ro)
is assumed to be met. What damages if any will be due?
Kahan (1989) has considered a version of the accident model that specifies
the expected loss L(r) as a deterministic function of precaution. He argues
that the injurer’s liability for accidents caused by his negligence would be
the difference L(rn)− L(ro). Since losses have the meaning of values with a
negative sign, such liability could equivalently be defined as β(ro) − β(rn).
It will be later shown that Kahan’s interpretation captures legal damages if
taken on average over the appropriate event.
To deal with the hypothetical value of B’s assets, it proves useful again
to consider the interaction between nature and party A in normal form. The
outcome space, from which nature is choosing at random, is still denoted by
Ω. In extension of the accident technology, the value of B’s assets resulting
from A’s decision r ∈ R and nature’s move ω ∈ Ω amounts to B(r,ω) ∈ ρB.
The normal form is consistent with the statistical data of the extended model
if
π{ω ∈ Ω : B(r,ω) = b} = f(b, r)
holds for all b ∈ ρB and r ∈ R.
If the hypothetical move of nature were observable, the legally correct
quantum of liability would be obvious: Victim B could recover that part of
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harm only, which is caused by A’s neglecting his obligation, i.e. the difference
B(ro,ω)−B(rn,ω). Occasionally, this difference may happen to be negative,
in which case party B would be enjoying a windfall gain caused by A’s negli-
gence. According to common legal practice, B may keep such windfall gains
for free. As a consequence, the quantum of legal damages would amount to
D(r,ω) = max[B(ro,ω)−B(rn,ω), 0].
Yet, the move of nature may not be observable. It may only be known,
that the actual move of nature must belong to some event Ω0 ⊂ Ω. Aver-
age legal damages then amount to the expected value of true legal damages
conditional on the observed event, i.e. to
d(r,Ω0) = E[D(r,ω) | Ω0].
Notice, with variable loss size, the observable event may contain, at the
same time, moves of nature, under which B suffers harm, as well as others,
under which he enjoys windfall gains due to A’s negligence. For such events,
potential windfall gains may be offset against losses over the observed event.
Legal damages reflecting this rule are denoted by
∆(r,Ω0) = E[B(ro,ω)−B(r,ω) | Ω0].
More precisely, since even this term may happen to be negative, legal dam-
ages amount to
δ(r,Ω0) = max [∆(r,Ω0), 0]
if windfall gains are offset against losses over the observed event. Comparing
the two measures,
0 ≤ δ(r,Ω0) ≤ d(r,Ω0)
most obviously hold for any decision and event. Notice, while Bayes’ rule
applies for d(r,Ω0) and ∆(r,Ω0), the damage measure δ(r,Ω0) need not obey
this rule any more.
From the incentive perspective, it does not matter, which version of the
rule is taken. In fact, consider any partition Ω = Ω1∪ ...∪Ωi ∪ ...∪ΩI of the
outcome space into observable events. Then the following proposition holds.
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Proposition 2 In expected terms, party B is at least as well off as if A had




π(Ωi) · d(rn,Ωi) ≥ β(rn) +
IX
i=1
π(Ωi) · δ(rn,Ωi) ≥ β(ro)




π(Ωi) · d(rn,Ωi) ≥ c(rn) +
IX
i=1
π(Ωi) · δ(rn,Ωi) > c(ro)
holds, no matter whether windfall gains are offset against losses over the
observed event or not.
Proof. In fact, by definition, it follows from Bayes’ rule that
IX
i=1
π(Ωi) · δ(rn,Ωi) ≥
IX
i=1
π(Ωi) ·∆(rn,Ωi) = β(ro)− β(rn)
must hold, from which the first claim of the proposition easily follows. By




π(Ωi) · δ(rn,Ωi) ≥ c(rn) + β(ro)− β(rn) > c(ro)
must hold, which establishes the second claim of the proposition.
If the data of the extended model arise from test series of cases that
differ only by trembles of nature taking place after A has chosen the level of
precaution, the situation is again referred to as pure uncertainty. To simplify
notation, the statistical data, i.e. the distribution of asset values under the
two levels are denoted by fn(b) = f(b, rn) and fo(b) = f(b, ro), respectively.
Suppose the event Ω0 = {ω ∈ Ω : Q(rn,ω) = b0} is observed. This means
that the actual value b0 of B’s assets is known but their hypothetical value
bo if A had met his obligation remains uncertain. Under pure uncertainty,
this event occurs with probability f(b0) and legal damages on average over




f o(bo) ·max[bo − b0, 0]





f o(bo) · (bo − b0) = β(ro)− b0.
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As the second version is more easy to grasp, I focus on the rule where windfall
gains are offset against losses. In this case, the actual value b0 must be
compared to the hypothetical expected value of the assets. The difference
if positive corresponds to legal damages on average over the observed event
provided that windfall gains are offset against losses.
If, however, the actual value of B’s assets under the negligent behavior of
A remains uncertain as well, then legal damages on average over this event
amount to
δ(rn,Ω) = ∆(rn,Ω) = β(ro)− β(rn)
and are equal to Kahan’s (1989) rule. Notice, for this equivalence to be true,
the actual value of B’s assets must remain uncertain and windfall gains must
be offset against losses over the whole outcome space Ω.
The following numerical example illustrates the alternative methods. The
value of B’s assets potentially attains the three levels b0 < b1 < b2 with
probabilities fn(b0) = 1/4, fn(b1) = 1/2 and fn(b2) = 1/4 if A has neglected
his obligation and with probabilities fo(b0) = 1/6, f o(b1) = 1/3 and fo(b2) =
1/2 if A had met his obligation. The expected value of B’s assets amounts
to
β(rn) = b0 +
3
4
· (b1 − b0) + 1
4
· (b2 − b1)
and to
β(ro) = b0 +
5
6
· (b1 − b0) + 1
2
· (b2 − b1),
respectively. Notice that the actual expected value is lower than the hypo-
thetical expected value because
β(ro)− β(rn) = 1
12
· (b1 − b0) + 1
4
· (b2 − b1) > 0
obviously holds.
Suppose the actual value of the affected assets under negligent behavior




· (b2 − b1) > δ(rn,Ω0) = 1
2
· (b2 − b1)− 1
6
· (b1 − b0)
if windfall gains are kept for free or offset against losses over the event,
respectively..
Under pure uncertainty, party B will enjoy hypothetical windfall gains
with positive probability. A priory theories on possible chains of causation,
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however, may rule out such windfall gains. If they do, the statistical data
cannot be interpreted as pure uncertainty any more. Rather, the test series
from which these data are derived must cover situations that differ also by
type. If, under negligent behavior, the actual value of B’s assets is known,
such information allows to update beliefs about the distribution of types.
Since the extension to type-contingent uncertainty is straightforward, details
are not presented in the paper.
5 Multiple injurers
For many practical cases of uncertain causation, more than one potential
injurer will be involved. If an accident occurs and several parties have ne-
glected their obligations, two questions must be settled. First, what quantum
of damages if any is granted to the victim and, second, how should the neg-
ligent injurers share this quantum? As it turns out, even if the accident
model is known in normal form and the move of nature were observable, new
conceptual issues arise.
To discuss them, the accident model is extended as follows. The class
of potential injurers is denoted by a = 1, ..., A. Party a is facing a decision
ra ∈ Ra and bears costs ca(ra)˙. Profiles of decisions are denoted by
r = (r1, ..., ra, ..., rA) ∈ R = R1 × ...×Ra × ...×RA





For simplicity, losses if they occur are assumed to be of fixed size L. At
profile r ∈ R, accidents are assumed to occur with probability ε(r). Loss size
L and probabilities ε(r) are referred to as the statistical data of the case.
Suppose it is party a’s obligation to decide roa ∈ Ra. The profile ro =
(ro1, ..., r
o
A) ∈ R of obligations is assumed to satisfy the Hand Formula
c(ro) + ε(ro) · L ≤ c(r) + ε(r) · L
for any other profile r ∈ R.
The actual decision is denoted by profile rn = (rn1 , ..., r
n
A). At least some
though not necessarily all of the A parties are assumed to having neglected
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their obligations, i.e. rn 6= ro. Let An = {a : rna 6= roa} denote the set of
negligent parties.
To express the accident model with several injurers in normal form, the
accident technology e : R × Ω → {0, 1} is now defined for any combination
of a decision profile with a move of nature. Suppose an accident has actually
occurred, i.e. e(rn,ω) = 1. Suppose it also would have occurred even if all
parties had met their obligations, i.e. e(ro,ω) = 1. Then party B could not
recover his loss. Therefore, in what follows, let me assume that the accident
would have been avoided if all had met their obligations, i.e. e(ro,ω) = 0.
To determine legal damages, the question must be addressed whose party’s
deviation has caused the accident.
Suppose the move of nature is observable and, for simplicity, just two
candidates are involved. If
e(ro1, r
n
2 ,ω) = 0 < e(rn1 , ro2,ω) = 1
holds then party 1 has obviously caused the accident. In fact, if just party
2 had kept his obligation, the accident would still have occurred whereas
it would have been avoided even if only party 1 had met his obligation.
Similarly, if e(ro1, r
n
2 ,ω) = 1 > e(rn1 , ro2,ω) = 0 then it was party 2’s deviation,
which has caused the accident.




2 ,ω) = e(rn1 , ro2,ω) = 1
then the accident were only avoided if both parties had jointly met their
obligations and, second, if
e(ro1, r
n
2 ,ω) = e(rn1 , ro2,ω) = 0
then the accident would have been avoided it either of them had met his
obligation. For these two combinations, the occurrence of an accident cannot
be attributed to a single injurer and, hence, the rule, according to which the
two parties should share total damages owed to B, cannot be derived from
principles of one-party-causation.
Since I am not aware of legal principles that fully settle the above issue, I
rather consider the class of all damage rules which satisfy two basic principles.
First, the victim is granted damages that, in expected terms, makes the
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victim at least as well off as if all potential injurers had met their obligations.
Second, by meeting his obligation, an injurer can unilaterally escape liability
and, hence, damages granted to the victim must be shared by those parties
that have actually neglected their obligations.
In formal terms, suppose Ω = Ω1 ∪ ... ∪ Ωi ∪ ...ΩI is a partition of the
outcome space into observable events Ωi. Let da(r,Ωi) denote damages owed







denote total damages granted to B in expected terms, both at actual decision
profile r. Then, as the first principle requires,
δ(r) ≥ [ε(r)− ε(ro)] · L






must hold where r−a = (r1, ..., ra−1, ra+1, ..., rA) denotes the decisions of all
parties except a. The following proposition establishes that meeting all oblig-
ations is a Nash equilibrium of the game among the potential injurers. More-
over, even if the parties a = 1, ..., A (or at least some of them) would be able
to collude they could not improve their joint situation as the following propo-
sition establishes. The proposition holds for any damage rule that obeys the
above two basic principles.7
Proposition 3 If the damage rules satisfies the two basic properties then,
by meeting all their obligations, the injurers minimize the sum of precaution
costs and damages owed to B, i.e. c(r) + δ(r) ≥ c(ro) must hold for all
decision profiles r ∈ R. Moreover, all parties have the incentive to meet their
obligations, i.e. ro is a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by any damage
rule satisfying the above two properties.
Proof. It follows from the Hand Formula and the property that party B is
at least as well off as if all injurers had met their obligations that
c(r) + δ(r) ≥ c(ro) + [ε(r)− ε(ro)] · L+ δ(r) ≥ c(ro)
7For a systematic dicsussion of general multilateral obligations, the reader is referred
to Schweizer (2005b).
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must hold indeed, which establishes the first claim. In particular, it then
follows that c(ra, ro−a) + δ(ra, ro−a) ≥ c(ro) and, hence, that
ca(ra) + δ(ra, ro−a) ≥ ca(roa)
must both hold. The last inequality establishes that meeting the own oblig-
ation is a best response to all the other injurer meeting theirs and, hence,
the profile ro is shown to be a Nash equilibrium.
Notice, two obvious versions of the damage rule would both satisfy the






c(ro)− c(rn) · d(r
n,Ωi)
in the proportion of individual cost savings or damages owed to B are shared






In terms of efficiency, both methods of sharing liabilities would provide in-
centives to meet all obligations and be coalition-proof as follows from the
above proposition.
The following numerical example from the introduction may illustrate
the findings summarized by Proposition 3. Suppose two parties a = 1, 2 are
candidates for having caused harm of fixed size L = 100 to B. If both had
met their obligations the accident would still have occurred with probabil-
ity ε(ro) = 2/10 whereas if both have neglected their obligations then the
probability of an accident would be ε(rn) = 7/10. If just one of the two
candidates had neglected his obligation then the probability of an accident
is ε(ro1, rn2 ) = 3/10 and ε(rn1 , ro2) = 5/10, respectively. To meet the two basic
principles, party 2 owes damages in expected terms δ(ro1, rn2 ) ≥ 10 whereas
party 1 owes damages in expected terms δ(rn1 , ro2) ≥ 30 to B if just one of
them has neglected his obligation. If both of them have neglected their oblig-
ations they jointly owe δ(rn) ≥ 50 to B in expected terms. With respect to




By definition, estimating legal damages requires to compare the actual, pos-
sibly uncertain, value of assets with their hypothetical value that would have
prevailed if the debtor had met his obligation. If the interaction between
debtor and nature were known in normal form and the move of nature could
be observed, comparing actual and hypothetical value would be straightfor-
ward. If just the normal form were known but the move of nature remains
hidden, true legal damages could still be determined though on average over
the observed event only. The present paper shows that awarding legal dam-
ages on average over observable events provides efficient incentives.
The traditional accident model assumes the probability of an accident to
be a function of the debtor’s decision and harm, if it occurs, to be of fixed size.
In general, different versions of the accident model in normal form may be
consistent with the same data of a traditional accident model. Worse, average
legal damages may well be different for different versions of the normal form
consistent with the same data. Only if the probability of an accident in case
the debtor has met his obligation is negligible, average legal damages are
equal to the full harm, no matter which normal form. Otherwise, additional
hypotheses about potential chains of causation are needed to determine legal
damages on average over observable events.
Throughout the paper it was assumed that the debtor knows his obliga-
tion at the time of his decision and that courts can verify beyond any doubt
whether a debtor has met or neglected his obligation. It is an interesting
topic of future research to give up some of these assumptions. It seems par-
ticularly worthwhile to examine the case where the debtors’ decisions are
actions that remain hidden to courts. While there exists a vast literature on
the hidden action problem, the question of interest would be whether legal
practice can be interpreted as if it were implementing some of the findings
from the hidden action literature.
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Figure 1: pure vs. type-contingent uncertainty
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